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When switching tasks, occasionally responding to bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant fea-
tures for two different tasks) slows performance on subsequent univalent stimuli, even when 
they do not share relevant features with bivalent stimuli. this performance slowing is labelled the 
bivalency effect. here, we investigated whether the bivalency effect results from an orienting re-
sponse to the infrequent stimuli (i.e., the bivalent stimuli). to this end, we compared the impact 
of responding to infrequent univalent stimuli to the impact of responding to infrequent bivalent 
stimuli. For the latter, the results showed a performance slowing for all trials following bivalent 
stimuli. this indicates a long-lasting bivalency effect, replicating previous findings. For infrequent 
univalent stimuli, however, the results showed a smaller and shorter-lived performance slowing. 
these results demonstrate that the bivalency effect does not simply reflect an orienting response 
to infrequent stimuli. rather it results from the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli, probably by 
episodic binding with the more demanding context created by them.
corresponding author: Beat Meier, institute of Psychology, University of 
Bern, Fabrikstr. 8, 3012 Bern, switzerland. e-mail: beat.meier@psy.unibe.ch
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 INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself driving home. You drive quickly but safely, and when 
you approach a red traffic light, you put one foot on the brake pedal 
and the other on the clutch. After years of practice, your behaviour 
is guided by unambiguous environmental cues. However, what would 
you do if both the red and the green traffic lights were lit at once? The 
purpose of this study was to shed light on the cognitive processes you 
engage in when encountering such ambiguous stimuli.
In a laboratory task, one way to investigate this type of situation 
is to use bivalent stimuli. Bivalent stimuli have relevant features for 
two different tasks and thus they induce a conflict about which task 
to perform (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 2008). To resolve this conflict, 
an adjustment of cognitive control is required in order to select task-
relevant features while suppressing distracting ones (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). 
Recent studies have shown that the occasional occurrence of bivalent 
stimuli triggers an adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent 
performance. That is, occasionally encountering bivalent stimuli slows 
performance on several subsequent univalent stimuli, even on those 
that share no relevant features with the bivalent stimuli (Meier, Rey-
Mermet, Woodward, Mueri, & Gutbrod, 2013; Meier, Woodward, 
Rey-Mermet, & Graf, 2009; Rey-Mermet, Koenig, & Meier, 2013; Rey-
Mermet & Meier, 2012a, 2012b; Woodward, Meier, Tipper, & Graf, 
2003; Woodward, Metzak, Meier, & Holroyd, 2008). 
In these studies, participants performed triplets of binary tasks 
on univalent stimuli, with bivalent stimuli occasionally occurring in 
one task (see Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a, for a review). For example, 
they were instructed to repeatedly perform a parity decision (odd vs. 
even) on black numerals, a colour decision (red vs. blue) on red or blue 
symbols, and a case decision (uppercase vs. lowercase) on black letters. 
For some case decisions, the letters were presented in red or blue print 
colour, thus turning them into bivalent stimuli. The results revealed a 
performance slowing for all tasks following bivalent stimuli, including 
those with stimuli that shared no relevant stimulus features with the 
bivalent stimuli (i.e., the parity decisions). 
This performance slowing, coined the bivalency effect, has now 
been demonstrated with different types of tasks, different types of 
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bivalent stimuli, across different modalities, and with overlapping as 
well as with non-overlapping response sets (Meier et al., 2009; Metzak, 
Meier, Graf, & Woodward, in press; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a). 
Furthermore, it is not affected by a manipulation of the interval be-
tween task triplets (i.e., 1,000 ms, 2,000 ms, 3,000 ms, or 5,000 ms) and 
it persists across at least four subsequent purely univalent triplets, that 
is, for more than 20 s (Meier et al., 2009). The bivalency effect has also 
been associated with activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, 
a brain area recruited for the adjustment of cognitive control (Grundy 
et al., 2013; Woodward et al., 2008). In an event-related potential (ERP) 
study, it was associated with an ERP component reflecting interference 
in cognitive control (Rey-Mermet et al., 2013). Moreover, amnesic pa-
tients did not show the long-lasting slowing typical for the bivalency 
effect. They only showed a short-lived slowing on the task that imme-
diately followed the bivalent stimulus (Meier et al., 2013).
Together, these findings indicate that the bivalency effect reflects a 
robust and long-lasting adjustment of cognitive control following the 
conflict induced by bivalent stimuli. Critically, the current cognitive 
control accounts cannot explain the bivalency effect, because these ac-
counts focus primarily on processes initiated by the stimulus, response, 
or task features (see Allport & Wylie, 2000; Egner, 2007; Hommel, 
2004; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). 
According to these accounts, after encountering a bivalent stimulus, 
bivalent stimulus features would be activated on the univalent trials 
that share a feature with the bivalent stimulus. These bivalent stimulus 
features would be inhibited, because they are irrelevant for task exe- 
cution (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999, 2000; 
Wylie & Allport, 2000). Alternatively, they would require an additional 
task-decision process in order to select the relevant task (Braverman & 
Meiran, 2010; Fagot, 1994; Meiran, Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995). In both cases, performance would be slowed but 
only for the univalent trials sharing relevant features with the bivalent 
stimuli. However, the bivalency effect is also found on the univalent 
trials sharing no relevant features with the bivalent stimuli (e.g., Meier 
et al., 2009; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a; Woodward et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the cognitive control accounts cannot fully explain the bi-
valency effect.
To account for the bivalency effect, we put forward the hypothesis 
that the bivalency effect is due to “episodic context binding” (Meier 
et al., 2009, 2013; Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a). As we found no bi-
valency effect for amnesic patients, we reasoned that most likely, this 
effect results from episodic binding (see Meier et al., 2013). However, 
as the bivalency effect occurs irrespective of stimulus, response, or 
task overlap (Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a; Woodward et al., 2003), 
this binding must go beyond stimulus, response, and task features, 
and thus extends to the particular context. Thus, extending the notion 
that a stimulus is bound to the task in which it occurs (Waszak et al., 
2003), we have suggested that the stimulus and the task are bound to 
the context in which they occur (i.e., episodic context binding). In the 
particular paradigm used to assess the bivalency effect, from the per-
spective of the participant, the context consists of all the three decision 
tasks (rather than just one of them). Thus, responding to these tasks 
in a given order creates a specific context and, concurrently, binds the 
tasks and the univalent stimuli to this context. As the three tasks are 
presented repeatedly, this specific context is reactivated constantly. 
However, responding to a task with a bivalent stimulus makes the con-
text more demanding. For subsequent decisions, the representation 
of the – now conflict-loaded – context is reactivated. This interferes 
with processing the tasks with purely univalent stimuli (Rey-Mermet 
et al., 2013), slowing down performance and resulting in the bivalency 
effect. Thus, according to the “episodic context binding” account, the 
bivalency effect reflects interference caused by the reactivation of the 
more demanding context created by bivalent stimuli.
An alternative explanation would be that bivalent stimuli capture 
attention simply because they occur infrequently (cf. Notebaert et 
al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; Nùñez Castellar, Kühn, Fias, & 
Notebaert, 2010). The resulting orienting response endures across a 
few subsequent trials, slowing down performance on univalent trials. 
Thus, the bivalency effect might represent an orienting response to-
wards infrequent events. Evidence in favour of such an interpretation 
can be derived from a study of Notebaert et al. (2009). In one of their 
experiments, participants had to perform a four-colour choice reaction 
time task. Colour intensity was adjusted in order to reach predefined 
accuracy levels. In a 75%-accuracy condition, colour intensity was set 
such that 75% of the responses were correct, and consequently, correct 
responses were frequent events whereas errors were infrequent events. 
In contrast, in a 35%-accuracy condition, 35% of the responses were 
correct, and consequently, errors were frequent events whereas correct 
responses were infrequent events. The results showed a performance 
slowing after an infrequent event, irrespective of whether this event 
was an error or a correct response. In another experiment, Notebaert 
et al. presented tones after a response was made. Here, the tones were 
oddball in 25% of the trials. The results showed a performance slowing 
after the oddball tones. Thus, in both experiments, an after-effect was 
found after an infrequent event, suggesting that the low frequency of 
the event was critical (cf. Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; Nùñez Castellar et 
al., 2010; see also Barcelo, Escera, Corral, & Periáñez, 2006).
The purpose of the present study was to determine whether an or- 
ienting response is sufficient to explain the bivalency effect. To do so, 
we tested whether responding to infrequent univalent stimuli produced 
a similar after-effect as responding to infrequent bivalent stimuli (i.e., 
the bivalency effect). During three blocks, participants had to perform 
a parity decision on numerals, a colour decision on symbols, and a case 
decision on letters. In Blocks 1 and 3 (the pure blocks), all stimuli were 
univalent. In Block 2 (the mixed block), some letters for the case deci-
sions were slightly modified in order to make them infrequent. We pre-
sented two conditions of infrequent stimuli. For the first condition (the 
bivalent condition), the infrequent stimuli were red or blue letters. As 
these stimuli had relevant features for two tasks (colour and case deci-
sions), they were bivalent. This condition is a replication of the bivalen-
cy effect (Meier et al., 2009; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a; Woodward 
et al., 2003, 2008). For the second condition (the univalent condition), 
the infrequent stimuli were green or yellow letters. As these stimuli had 
relevant features for one task only (i.e., the case decision), they were 
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univalent. However, they varied on the same task dimension as the 
bivalent stimuli (i.e., colour). Therefore, this condition enables a close 
comparison with the condition that involves infrequent bivalent stimuli.
We hypothesized that if infrequency is the factor that causes the 
performance slowing that has been interpreted as the bivalency effect, 
responding to infrequent univalent stimuli would result in a similar 
after-effect as the bivalency effect (Notebaert et al., 2009; Notebaert 
& Verguts, 2011; Nùñez Castellar et al., 2010). In this case, infrequent 
bivalent and univalent stimuli would slow all subsequent tasks across 
several trials. Alternatively, if the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli 
is indeed the critical factor, responding to infrequent univalent stimuli 
would produce a different pattern than the bivalency effect (Meier et al., 
2009; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a, 2012b; Woodward et al., 2003, 2008). 
Specifically, for the condition with infrequent bivalent stimuli, we expec- 
ted an enduring performance slowing for all tasks, replicating previous 
findings (Meier et al., 2009). In contrast, for the condition with infre-
quent univalent stimuli, we expected a reduced and short-lived slowing.
MeThOD
Participants
Participants were 36 volunteers (19 women and 17 men, Mage = 23.4, 
SD = 3.2) from the University of Bern. Half of them were assigned to 
the condition with infrequent univalent stimuli and the other half to 
the condition with infrequent bivalent stimuli. Participants were as-
signed to each condition alternatingly. The study was approved by the 
local ethical committee of the University of Bern.
Materials
For the parity decision, the stimuli were the numerals 1 through 8, 
each displayed in black. For the colour decision, the stimuli were the 
symbols %, #, $, and §, each displayed in either blue or red. For the case 
decision, the stimuli were the upper- or lowercase consonants n, p, v, 
s, each displayed in black. All stimuli were presented as triplicate (e.g., 
777, &&&, and nnn) at the centre of the computer screen in 60-point 
Times New Roman font (cf. Meier et al., 2009; Woodward et al., 2003). 
As in our previous bivalency effect studies (Meier et al., 2009, 2013; 
Rey-Mermet et al., 2013; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a), we created a 
set of eight infrequent bivalent incompatible stimuli by presenting the 
letters in either red or blue. We created a set of 16 infrequent univalent 
stimuli by presenting the letters in either green or yellow (4 letters × 2 
cases × 2 colours). From the corresponding set, six infrequent stimuli 
were determined randomly for each participant.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were informed that the ex-
periment involved three different tasks: parity decisions about nume- 
rals, colour decisions about symbols, and case decisions about letters. 
They were instructed to respond by pressing one of two computer keys 
(“b” and “n”) with their left and right index fingers, respectively, for 
each of the three tasks. The mapping information, printed on paper, 
was presented below the computer screen throughout the experiment. 
Participants were informed that, for some of the case decisions, the let-
ters would be modified. In the bivalent condition, they were told that 
these letters would be presented in either blue or red; in the univalent 
condition, they were told that these letters would be presented in either 
green or yellow. All participants were instructed to ignore the modifi-
cation and to continue making case decisions.
After the instructions, a block of 30 task triplets was presented for 
practice. Each task triplet required making a parity decision, a colour 
decision, and a case decision, as illustrated in Figure 1. For each trial, a 
stimulus was selected randomly and was displayed until the participant 
responded. Then, the screen blanked for 500 ms before the next stimu-
lus appeared. After each task triplet, an additional blank appeared for 
1,500 ms. After the practice block and a brief break, each participant 
Figure 1.
example of one univalent task triplet. Participants carried out a parity decision (odd vs. even) on numerals, a colour decision (red vs. blue) 
on symbols, and a case decision (upper- vs. lowercase) on letters. on an infrequent task triplet (not pictured here), the letters were pre-
sented in colour. For the bivalent condition, they were printed in either blue or red, for the univalent condition in either green or yellow.
777 
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completed three experimental blocks without break between blocks. 
Block 1 included 32 task triplets, with the first two task triplets ser- 
ving as “warm-up” sequences which were discarded from the analyses. 
Blocks 2 and 3 had 30 task triplets each.
For Blocks 1 and 3 (the pure blocks), only frequent univalent sti- 
muli were presented. For Block 2 (the mixed block), frequent univalent 
stimuli were presented except on 20% of the case decisions in which 
infrequent stimuli appeared. Trials with infrequent stimuli were evenly 
interspersed among the 30 task triplets of the block; occurring in every 
fifth task triplet, specifically in the 3rd, 8th, 13th, 18th, 23rd, and 28th 
sequences. The entire experiment lasted about 20 min.
Data analysis
For each participant and each task, the accuracy rates and the median 
decision times (DTs) for correct responses were computed for each 
task triplet following an infrequent stimulus in the mixed block and for 
each corresponding task triplet in the pure Blocks 1 and 3. Specifically, 
an infrequent stimulus was presented on every fifth task triplet in the 
mixed block, and this task triplet was designated with the label N, with 
succeeding task triplets labelled N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, and N + 4. To 
account for general training effects, we averaged the data from the pure 
Blocks 1 and 3 for each task, each task triplet, and each participant. An 
alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections are reported where appropriate and effect sizes are ex-
pressed as partial η2 values.
ResUlTs
As in the previous bivalency effect studies (Meier et al., 2009; Rey-
Mermet & Meier, 2012a, 2012b; Woodward et al., 2003), we first in-
vestigated the cost produced by infrequent stimuli. Second, we focused 
on the main objective of the study, that is, the different after-effects of 
infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli.
Costs of infrequent stimuli
We compared the costs produced by infrequent bivalent and univa-
lent stimuli (i.e., the coloured letters of the case decisions from the 
task triplets N of the mixed block). To do so, we assessed whether 
performance on infrequent stimuli was worse than performance on 
the corresponding frequent stimuli (i.e., the black letters of the case 
decisions from the task triplets N + 1 until N + 4 of the mixed block), 
and whether this cost differed between both conditions of infrequent 
stimuli (bivalent vs. univalent). 
Decision times
For the bivalent condition, performance was slower on infrequent 
stimuli (M = 1,011 ms, SE = 95) than on the corresponding frequent 
stimuli (M = 716 ms, SE = 42). Similarly, for the univalent condi-
tion, performance was slower on infrequent stimuli (M = 1,041 ms, 
SE = 83) than on the corresponding frequent stimuli (M = 677 ms, 
SE = 30). A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Stimulus 
Frequency (infrequent, corresponding frequent) as a within-subject 
factor and Condition of Infrequent Stimuli (bivalent, univalent) as a 
between-subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of stimulus 
frequency, F(1, 34) = 39.81, p < .001, η2 = .54. No other main effect or 
interaction was significant, Fs < 1, ps > .52, η2 < .01. Thus, performance 
was significantly slower on infrequent stimuli than on corresponding 
frequent stimuli, but this cost was similar for both infrequent bivalent 
and univalent stimuli (295 and 364 ms, respectively). 
AccurAcy
For the bivalent condition, performance was lower on infrequent 
stimuli (M = .89, SE = .03) than on the corresponding frequent stimuli 
(M = .95, SE = .02). Similarly, for the univalent condition, performance 
was lower on infrequent stimuli (M = .97, SE = .02) than on the corre-
sponding frequent stimuli (M = .98, SE = .005). The two-way ANOVA 
with Stimulus Frequency (infrequent, corresponding frequent) as a 
within-subject factor and Condition of Infrequent Stimuli (bivalent, 
univalent) as a between-subjects factor showed a significant main ef-
fect of condition of infrequent stimuli, F(1, 34) = 10.65, p < .01, η2 = .24. 
No other main effect or interaction was significant, Fs < 2.75, ps > .11, 
η2 < .07. Thus, accuracy was higher for the univalent condition 
(M = .98, SE = .01) than for the bivalent condition (M = .92, SE = .02). 
However, no cost was found between the infrequent stimuli and the 
corresponding frequent stimuli, and this did not differ between both 
conditions. 
Together, these findings show no differences in the costs pro-
duced by infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli. This rules out 
that a difference in the after-effects resulted from a priori differ-
ences in the costs produced by infrequent bivalent and univalent 
stimuli.
After-effects of infrequent stimuli
Decision times
The main objective was to examine whether responding to in-
frequent univalent stimuli would produce a similar after-effect as 
responding to infrequent bivalent stimuli. To this end, we tested 
performance on univalent trials following infrequent bivalent stimuli 
and on those following infrequent univalent stimuli. The most relevant 
results are the DTs from the univalent trials for each task in the mixed 
block compared to those from the pure block across the task triplets 
N + 1 until N + 4. These results are depicted in Figure 2. We carried 
out a four-way ANOVA with Block (pure, mixed), Task (parity, colour, 
case), and Task Triplet (N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, N + 4) as within-subject 
factors and Condition of Infrequent Stimuli (bivalent, univalent) as a 
between-subjects factor. 
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of task, F(1.42, 
48.46) = 10.10, p < .01, η2 = .23, and of task triplet, F(3, 102) = 4.58, 
p < .01, η2 = .12. More importantly, there were also a main effect of 
block, F(1, 34) = 23.63, p < .001, η2 = .41, and a significant interaction 
between Block and Task Triplet, F(3, 102) = 5.57, p < .01, η2 = .14. Thus, 
performance was slowed after infrequent stimuli and this performance 
slowing decreased across the task triplets (from 133 ms in N + 1 to 42 ms 
in N + 4). 
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Most critically, the two-way interaction between Block and Con- 
dition of Infrequent Stimuli was significant, F(1, 34) = 7.72, p < .01, 
η2 = .18. This was caused by a larger performance slowing after infre-
quent bivalent stimuli, M = 110 ms, SE = 26, with t(17) = 4.19, p < .01; 
than after infrequent univalent stimuli, M = 30 ms, SE = 12, with 
t(17) = 2.52, p < .05. Thus, the bivalency effect (i.e., the slowing after 
infrequent bivalent stimuli) was significantly larger than the perform-
ance slowing after infrequent univalent stimuli. 
Moreover, the four-way interaction between Block, Task, Task 
Triplet, and Condition of Infrequent Stimuli approached significance, 
F(3.85, 130.99) = 2.05, p < .09, η2 = .06, suggesting that the performance 
slowing after infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli persisted dif-
ferently across tasks and task triplets. Due to the theoretical and prac- 
tical interest, we followed up this interaction by conducting three-way 
repeated-measures ANOVAs for each Condition of Infrequent Stimuli 
(bivalent and univalent), with the factors Block (pure, mixed), Task 
(parity, colour, case), and Task Triplet (N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, N + 4). 
For the bivalent condition, the three-way ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of block, F(1, 17) = 17.59, p < .01, η2 = .51, of task, 
F(1.37, 22.32) = 5.88, p < .05, η2 = .26, and of task triplet, F(3, 51) = 
3.07, p < .05, η2 = .15, as well as a significant interaction between Block 
and Task Triplet, F(3, 51) = 3.75, p < .01, η2 = .18. No other interaction 
was significant, Fs < 1.84, ps > .16, η2 < .10. Thus, the bivalency effect 
decreased across the task triplets from 204 ms to 106 ms, to 77 ms, and 
to 52 ms for N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, and N + 4, respectively (see Panel A 
of Figure 2). In follow-up two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with 
the factors Block (pure, mixed) and Task (parity, colour, case), the main 
effect of block was significant for the task triplets N + 1 until N + 3; 
N + 1: F(1, 17) = 18.70, p < .001, η2 = .52; N + 2: F(1, 17) = 4.94, p < .05, 
η2 = .22; N + 3: F(1, 17) = 5.86, p < .05, η2 = .26; and marginally sig-
nificant for the task triplet N + 4: F(1, 17) = 3.55, p = .08, η2 = .17. 
Across the four task triplets, no interaction between Block and Task 
was significant, Fs < 1.34, ps > .27, η2 < .07. Thus, the bivalency effect 
decreased across task triplets, irrespective of the tasks, but remained 
significant up to the task triplets N + 4. This finding replicates the per-
sistence of the bivalency effect (Meier et al., 2009).
For the univalent condition, the three-way ANOVA with the fac-
tors Block (pure, mixed), Task (parity, colour, case), and Task Triplet 
(N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, N + 4) showed a significant main effect of block, 
F(1, 17) = 6.35, p < .05, η2 = .27, and of task, F(1.51, 25.62) = 4.35, 
p < .05, η2 = .20. More importantly, there were also significant interac-
tions between Block and Task Triplet as well as between Block, Task, 
and Task Triplet, F(3, 51) = 3.27, p < .05, η2 = .16, and F(6, 102) = 2.65, 
p < .05, η2 = .13, respectively. No other main effect or interaction was 
significant, Fs < 1.88, ps > .14, η2 < .10. Thus, the performance slow-
ing following green or yellow letters decreased rapidly both across 
tasks and task triplets (see Panel B of Figure 2). In follow-up two-way 
repeated-measures ANOVAs with Block (pure, mixed) and Task (pari- 
ty, colour, case), the main effect of block was significant for the task 
triplets N + 1 and N + 2; N + 1: F(1, 17) = 12.81, p < .01, η2 = .43; and 
Figure 2.
Mean decision times for task triplets from the mixed block (filled circles) and for corresponding task triplets from the pure block (empty 
circles). task triplet N refers to the triplet containing an infrequent stimulus for the case decision in the mixed block; subsequent task 
triplets are labelled N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, and N + 4, respectively. error bars represent standard errors. Panel A. condition with infrequent 
bivalent stimuli. Panel B. condition with infrequent univalent stimuli.
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N + 2: F(1, 17) = 7.07, p < .05, η2 = .29, but not for subsequent task 
triplets, Fs < 2.03, ps > .17, η2 < .11. Thus, the performance slowing 
following infrequent univalent stimuli decreased across the first two 
task triplets (62 and 40 ms, respectively) and was no longer significant 
at triplets N + 3 and N + 4 (-13 and 32 ms, respectively). Moreover, at 
both task triplets N + 1 and N + 2, an interaction between Block and 
Task was observed, F(1.51, 25.72) = 3.08, p < .08, η2 = .15, and F(2, 34) 
= 4.39, p < .05, η2 = .20, respectively. For the task triplets N + 1, per-
formance was significantly slowed on parity and colour decisions, but 
not on case decisions; parity: M = 105 ms, SE = 42, with t(17) = 2.49, 
p < .05; and colour: M = 86 ms, SE = 27, with t(17) = 3.18, p < .01; 
but case: M = -6 ms, SE = 26, with t(17) = -0.23, p = .82. For the task 
triplets N + 2, performance was significantly slowed on colour and case 
decisions, but not on parity decisions; colour: M = 82 ms, SE = 27, with 
t(17) = 3.02, p < .01; and case: M = 55 ms, SE = 19, with t(17) = 2.84, 
p < .05; but parity: M = -19 ms, SE = 28, with t(17) = -0.67, p = .51. This 
indicates that infrequent univalent stimuli produce a shorter-lived and 
more task-specific effect than infrequent bivalent stimuli.
AccurAcy
The accuracy rates are depicted in Figure 3. Despite the fact that 
they were close to ceiling, we also conducted a four-way ANOVA with 
Block (pure, mixed), Task (parity, colour, case), and Task Triplet (N + 1, 
N + 2, N + 3, N + 4) as within-subject factors and Condition of 
Infrequent Stimuli (bivalent, univalent) as a between-subjects factor. 
This ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction between 
Task, Task Triplet, and Condition of Infrequent Stimuli, F(4.50, 152.98) 
= 2.41, p < .05, η2 = .07.1 No other main effect or interaction was sig-
nificant, Fs < 2.14, ps > .14, η2 < .06. Thus, there was no main effect 
or interaction involving block, which indicates that no speed-accuracy 
trade-off compromised the critical DTs effects.
DIsCUssION
The purpose of the present study was to test whether the bivalency 
effect results from an orienting response towards infrequent bivalent 
stimuli. To this end, we compared the after-effect of responding to 
infrequent bivalent stimuli (i.e., the bivalency effect) to the after-effect 
of responding to infrequent but univalent stimuli. For the infrequent 
bivalent stimuli condition, the results showed a performance slowing 
for all four task triplets, and this effect lasted at least for 20 s (required 
for making four task triplets, i.e., 12 decisions, each requiring ap-
proximately 750 ms, plus eight blanks of 500 ms, plus four blanks of 
2,000 ms). This indicates a long-lasting bivalency effect, replicating 
previous findings (cf. Meier et al., 2009; Rey-Mermet et al., 2013). In 
contrast, for the infrequent univalent stimuli condition, the results 
showed that performance was slowed for the first two tasks immedia- 
tely following infrequent univalent stimuli. For the subsequent task 
Figure 3.
Mean accuracy rates for task triplets from the mixed block (filled circles) and for corresponding task triplets from the pure block (empty 
circles). task triplet N refers to the triplet containing an infrequent stimulus for the case decision in the mixed block; subsequent task 
triplets are labelled N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, and N + 4, respectively. error bars represent standard errors. Panel A. condition with infrequent 
bivalent stimuli. Panel B. condition with infrequent univalent stimuli.
 
.85
.90
.95
1.00
parity colour case parity colour case parity colour case parity colour case parity colour case
N N + 1 N + 2 N + 3 N + 4
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
Infrequent bivalent condition 
pure mixed
A 
.85
.90
.95
1.00
parity colour case parity colour case parity colour case parity colour case parity colour case
N N + 1 N + 2 N + 3 N + 4
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
Infrequent univalent condition 
pure mixed
B 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Infrequent Bivalent Condition
Infrequent Univalent Condition
Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case
 + 1  + 2  + 3  + 4
Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case Parity Colour Case
 + 1  + 2  + 3  + 4
AdvAnces in cognitive PsychologyreseArch Article
http://www.ac-psych.org2013 • volume 9(3) • 146-155152
triplet, performance was still slowed on the tasks sharing features with 
the infrequent univalent stimuli. However, compared to the infrequent 
bivalent condition, no longer-lasting effect materialized. 
It must be noted that although different after-effects were found af-
ter infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli, there was no difference in 
the costs produced by infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli. Thus, 
responding to infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli did not result 
in differences within the trial itself, but it did result in differences for 
subsequent trials. This rules out the possibility that different after- 
effects resulted from a priori differences between infrequent bivalent 
and univalent stimuli. This is important because infrequent bivalent 
stimuli had task-relevant features for another task (i.e., the fea-
tures “red” and “blue” for the colour decision), and thus they could 
have attracted more attention than infrequent univalent stimuli. 
Consequently, they could have produced a larger orienting response 
for the trial in which they occur as well as for the subsequent trials. In 
this case, the larger and long-lasting bivalency effect would have simply 
resulted from a larger orienting response. However, the present results 
showed no differences in the costs produced by infrequent bivalent and 
univalent stimuli. This suggests that the orienting response is similar 
for infrequent bivalent and univalent stimuli.
More importantly, the findings of the present study showed that 
the infrequence of univalent stimuli results in an orienting response 
that was sufficient to slow down the two subsequent decisions (i.e., the 
parity and colour decisions of task triplets N + 1). These results indicate 
that the bivalency effect is more than an orienting response. Moreover, 
they extend previous findings that the infrequency of an event has an 
impact on subsequent performance (cf. Barcelo et al., 2006; Notebaert 
et al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; Nùñez Castellar et al., 2010). 
In those previous studies, a performance slowing was found on the trial 
following an infrequent event, irrespective of whether this infrequent 
event was an oddball tone, a correct response, or an error (cf. Barcelo 
et al., 2006; Notebaert et al., 2009). Here, we also found that perform-
ance was slowed after an infrequent event, even when the event was an 
infrequent univalent stimulus. Thus, investigating the after-effects of 
a large variety of infrequent events, such as errors, infrequent correct 
responses, oddball tones, or infrequent univalent stimuli is a promising 
avenue for future research in order to clarify the contribution of the 
orienting response to performance.
It is also noteworthy that in the present study, the infrequence of 
univalent stimuli also slowed down some subsequent decisions (i.e., 
the colour and case decisions of task triplet N + 2), but only on those 
tasks that had overlapping features with the infrequent univalent 
stimuli. Thus, it is possible that because of this overlap, representations 
of infrequent stimulus features were activated, and this interfered with 
current processing, slowing down performance (see Allport & Wylie, 
1999, 2000). However, this pattern of slowing was not predicted and its 
interpretation is post-hoc and somewhat speculative. Further research 
is necessary to replicate this specific pattern and to provide a more 
solid foundation for this interpretation. 
Together, the present results demonstrate that the short-lived and 
– at least partly – task-specific after-effect triggered by infrequent uni-
valent stimuli is different from the robust and long-lasting bivalency 
effect. Therefore, the infrequence of bivalent stimuli and its resulting 
orienting response may explain the performance slowing on the first 
trials following bivalent stimuli, but not the whole bivalency effect 
across the four task triplets. Consequently, responding to infrequent 
bivalent stimuli results in an additional process that is related to the 
conflict induced by bivalent stimuli. One possible additional process 
may be the reactivation of the more demanding context created by 
bivalent stimuli, such as proposed in the episodic context binding ac-
count (Meier et al., 2009, 2013; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a, 2012b; cf. 
also Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a).
More generally, the study of the bivalency effect extends cognitive 
control research in which conflict is induced by incongruent stimuli 
(i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different responses, such 
as in the Stroop and Flanker tasks2; cf. Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 
2007). Typically, performance is slowed on incongruent stimuli com-
pared to congruent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for one 
response). This congruence effect is smaller after incongruent stimuli 
than after congruent stimuli. This reduction in congruence effect has 
been labelled congruence sequence effect (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Clayson & Larson, 2011; Egner, 2007; Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012). 
The congruence effect is also smaller when the proportion of incon-
gruent stimuli increases in the block. This second reduction has been 
labelled proportion congruence effect (e.g., Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 
1992; Hommel, 1994; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). 
Previous research has shown that the congruence sequence effect may 
be dependent on stimulus and response overlap, affecting only those 
subsequent trials that shared stimulus or response features with incon-
gruent stimuli (Akçay & Hazeltine, 2008; Hazeltine, Lightman, Schwarb, 
& Schumacher, 2011; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; but see Ullsperger, 
Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). The congruence sequence effect may 
also be specific to the source of conflict, only affecting the subsequent 
trials that shared features with the conflict induced by incongruent 
stimuli. That is, responding to incongruent Stroop stimuli induced a 
congruence sequence effect when the subsequent stimuli were Stroop 
stimuli, but not when they were Flanker stimuli (e.g., Egner, 2008; 
Egner, Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 2010; 
Notebaert & Verguts, 2008; Schlaghecken, Refaat, & Maylor, 2011; but 
see Freitas, Bahar, Yang, & Banai, 2007; Kunde & Wühr, 2006). For the 
proportion congruence effect, previous research has shown that it may 
be affected by the proportion of incongruent trials at the item level. In 
this research, participants were usually asked to perform a Stroop task 
with at least four colours split in two binary pairs. For one binary pair 
(e.g., red and blue), the trials were mostly incongruent, whereas for the 
other binary pair (e.g., green and yellow), the trials were mostly con-
gruent. Each colour word was printed in its own colour for congruent 
items and in the colour of the other member of its pair for incongruent 
items. Those items that were “mostly incongruent” showed a smaller 
congruence effect than those items that were “mostly congruent” 
(Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 
2003; but see Bugg, McDaniel, Scullin, & Braver, 2011, for list-wide 
proportion congruence effects). These findings lead to the conclusion 
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that both the congruence sequence and the proportion congruence ef-
fects are – to some extent – the result of binding processes operating 
across stimulus-, response-, and/or task-representations (e.g., Blais 
et al., 2007; Hommel, 2004; Mayr et al., 2003; Verguts & Notebaert, 
2009). In contrast, the bivalency effect is not affected by the overlap 
of stimulus-, response-, and task-representations. In fact, it occurs on 
univalent trials, which have no stimulus-, response- and task-feature 
overlap with the previously encountered bivalent stimuli (Rey-Mermet 
& Meier, 2012a; Woodward et al., 2003). Thus, the bivalency effect 
goes beyond stimulus, response, and task representations, but rather 
includes the context representation (see Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a). 
Therefore, investigating the bivalency effect reflects a new way to ex-
plore cognitive control.
In a recent framework, Braver and colleagues have differentiated 
between proactive and retroactive cognitive control (Braver, 2012; 
Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). Proactive control reflects the sustained 
and anticipatory maintenance of task-relevant representations, and is 
initiated before a conflict is encountered. In contrast, reactive control 
reflects the transient stimulus-driven reactivation of task representa-
tions after a conflict was encountered. The bivalency effect clearly 
contains a reactive component because it reflects an adjustment of 
cognitive control following the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli. 
However, due to the long-lasting nature of the bivalency effect across 
trials, it may also reflect a proactive control process in anticipation of 
the occurrence of the next bivalent stimulus. We tested this possibili- 
ty in a recent study with a similar set-up as the present study, but in 
order to induce proactive control, we asked participants to deliberately 
search for (infrequent) bivalent stimuli (Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012b). 
Moreover, they were instructed to respond with a different key-press 
(i.e., the “h” key) whenever they noticed such an (infrequent) bivalent 
stimulus. The results showed a performance slowing for the first task 
triplet that immediately followed the bivalent stimuli, reflecting an or- 
ienting response (cf. Notebaert et al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; 
Nùñez Castellar et al., 2010). In addition, on subsequent task triplets, 
a performance slowing was found but only for those univalent stimuli 
which shared relevant features with bivalent stimuli (i.e., the colour and 
case decisions). Therefore, inducing proactive control does not result 
in the same pattern of slowing as the bivalency effect, which suggests 
that the bivalency effect is mainly driven by reactive control. 
To summarize, the findings of the present study show that the 
adjustment of cognitive control underlying the bivalency effect results 
from the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli and not simply from the 
occurrence of infrequent stimuli. For the example of encountering a 
traffic light with an infrequent pattern, it suggests that for a blinking 
red light (infrequent univalent condition), you will probably increase 
control at this particular junction and at the subsequent junction with 
a “normal” traffic light. In contrast, when you encounter a traffic light 
with red and green lights lit at once (infrequent bivalent condition), 
you will probably show a longer lasting increase of cognitive control. 
According to the episodic context binding account, this is because in 
this situation, encountering univalent stimuli will reactivate the pre- 
vious conflict-loaded context.
Footnotes
1 To further investigate the significant interaction between Task, 
Task Triplet, and Condition, we averaged the data across the two 
block types and we carried out follow-up two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVAs for each Condition of Infrequent Stimuli, with the factors 
Task (parity, colour, case) and Task Triplet (N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, N + 4). 
For the univalent condition, the ANOVA revealed no significant main 
effect or interaction, Fs < 1.12, ps > .35, η2 < .06. In contrast, for the biva-
lent condition, the two-way interaction between Task and Task Triplet 
approached significance, F(6, 102) = 2.05, p < .07, η2 = .11. Therefore, 
we conducted a follow-up one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the factor Task Triplet (N + 1, N + 2, N + 3, N + 4) for each task sepa-
rately. Only for the colour decisions, the one-way ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of task triplet, F(3, 51) = 3.52, p < .05, η2 = .17, 
with a significant cubic component, F(1, 17) = 6.01, p < .05, η2 = .26. 
Thus, for the bivalent condition accuracy on colour decisions was 
higher in the task triplets N + 1 and N + 3 (both Ms = .98, SE = .01) 
than in the task triplets N + 2 and N + 4 (M = .93, SE = .02, and M = .96, 
SE = .02, respectively).
2 In the Stroop task, stimuli are colour words that are printed in 
colour (e.g., the word red printed in red or blue), and participants are 
asked to indicate the colour of the word. Incongruent Stroop stimuli 
are colour words that are printed in a different colour (e.g., the word 
red printed in blue). In the Flanker task, stimuli consist of strings of 
letters (e.g., HHH or SHS), and participants are asked to indicate the 
identity of the central letter. Incongruent Flanker stimuli are letter 
strings in which the central letter is different from the flanking letters 
(e.g., SHS). 
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